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Abstract: In A Theory of Justice, Rawls concludes that individuals in the original position 
would choose to adopt a system of democratic equality governed by his two principles of 
justice. However, Rawls mistakenly defines the possibility space within which individuals in 
his original position must make their choice. An alternative account of the possibility space 
created by Rawls’s original position reveals that a system of liberal equality, according to which 
distributive shares would be determined by market processes, would be preferred by risk-averse 
individuals. However, such individuals would guard against the erosion of the social bases of 
self-respect by including a social safety net among the basic equal liberties secured by Rawls’s 
first principle of justice.
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Early in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls (1971, 1999) considers and rejects an 
interpretation of his two principles of justice called “liberal equality” in favor of an 
alternative interpretation that he styles “democratic equality”– an otherwise similar system 
that substitutes his famous “difference principle” of distributive justice for distribution 
according to market processes. Rawls has been criticized for supposedly claiming that 
a person’s relationship to her own attributes is morally arbitrary, and that the attributes 
of individuals are therefore properly considered a social resource. I argue that this is an 
uncharitable interpretation of the text. It is an individual’s relationship to the distribution 
of natural attributes in her society that Rawls considers arbitrary, not her relationship to 
her own natural attributes. I then show that what I will call the “libertarian objection” 
nonetheless has some purchase as a criticism of Rawls’s analysis, which misapprehends 
the possibility space created by the original position. I offer an alternative account of the 
uncertainties faced by an individual in the original position, called the Unknown Society 
Model. The Unknown Society Model indicates that risk-averse individuals in Rawls’s 
original position will unanimously prefer distribution according to market processes to 
the difference principle and will therefore adopt a system of liberal equality rather than 
a system of democratic equality. Nonetheless, the Unknown Society Model implies that 
individuals in the original position are also likely to include a social safety net on their list 
of basic liberties in order to preserve the social bases of self-respect.
I. LIBER A L EQUA LIT Y VS. TH E DIFFER ENCE PR I NCIPLE
 John Rawls’s theory of justice is anchored by two fundamental principles, which 
apply to the “basic structure”1 of society:
1] The basic structure of a society is the scheme by which “the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls 
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First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.                          
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all. (Rawls 1999, 53)
Rawls’s first principle secures an equal right to a set of basic liberties for every 
member of society, and these rights are given priority over all other considerations of 
justice (1999, 55). Once the equal basic liberties are secure, the institutions comprising 
the basic structure should seek to implement the second principle. Rawls suggests that 
both clauses of his second principle are ambiguous, and he disambiguates them in a short 
discussion near the beginning of his analysis (1999, 57).
The principle that positions and offices should be “open to all” could be read 
simply to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of irrelevant characteristics, 
an interpretation that Rawls calls “careers open to talents” (1999, 57). Rawls certainly 
endorses the requirement of non-discrimination, but he concludes that his second 
principle of justice must go further to ensure that individuals have genuine, as opposed to 
merely formal, opportunities to pursue social positions for which their natural attributes 
make them well-suited. He therefore settles on a broader interpretation of this part of his 
second principle, called “fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1999, 63). Fair equality 
of opportunity requires, in addition to non-discrimination, the provision of talent 
development opportunities to less privileged members of society that enable them to 
compete on equal terms for offices and positions in which they have the natural capacity 
to succeed.2
Rawls then considers two possible interpretations of his requirement that social 
and economic inequalities will be “reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage” 
(1999, 53). One interpretation of this clause is what Rawls calls “efficiency”, according to 
which the principle is satisfied by a competitive market economy that maximizes the total 
wealth in society, and in which an individual’s distributive share of wealth and income 
will correspond to the relative productive value of her natural attributes (as developed in 
accordance with fair equality of opportunity), subject to her “willingness to use them” 
in the workplace (1999, 62-63). A system combining equal basic liberties, fair equality of 
opportunity, and distribution according to market processes is called “liberal equality” 
(Rawls 1999, 57).
Rawls characterizes the system of liberal equality as an “unstable” stopping place in 
his search for the best principles of justice, because “there is no more reason to permit the 
distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than 
by historical and social fortune” (1999, 64). Once we see the distribution of natural assets 
1999, 6).
2] Rawls explains, “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willing-
ness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social 
system” (1999, 63).
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in society as “morally arbitrary”, Rawls thinks we will be moved to prefer an alternative 
interpretation of this clause according to which the principle is satisfied by institutional 
arrangements that maximize the wealth and income available to “the representative 
unskilled worker” whom he supposes will be among the least well-endowed “full and 
active participants” in an otherwise just society (Rawls 1999, 68, 84). Rawls refers to this 
interpretation as the “difference principle”, and he refers to the system combining equal 
basic liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle as “democratic 
equality” (1999, 57).
II. TH E LIBERTA R I A N OBJECTION
Rawls’s treatment of what he refers to as “natural assets” or “natural attributes” 
(1999, 11, 87, 172) – “intelligence, strength, and the like” (1999, 11) – in his design and 
analysis of the original position is perhaps the most enduringly controversial aspect of his 
theory. Some critics have objected to the difference principle on the basis that Rawls has 
inappropriately ignored the moral significance of a person’s relationship to her own natural 
attributes. Such critics complain that an individual’s natural attributes are constitutive of 
her and therefore cannot be arbitrary from a moral point of view.3 
Some language in A Theory of Justice can be interpreted in ways that seem to bolster 
this case. For example, Rawls refers to “the outcome of natural chance” and to “the outcome 
of the natural lottery” as morally arbitrary (1999, 11, 64). If Rawls meant to say that a 
person’s relationship to her own attributes is a matter of chance, then perhaps his theory 
presupposes an implausible metaphysical account of the nature of persons. At times, 
Rawls also uses language that could be interpreted to mean that the natural attributes 
of persons should be considered a common resource. For example, Rawls writes that in 
a society governed by his principles of justice, the less naturally well-endowed “view the 
greater abilities of others as a social asset to be used for the common advantage” (1999, 
92).
However, there is at least as much textual evidence to suggest that Rawls held neither 
an implausible metaphysical view of the nature of persons nor so controversial a view of 
the moral irrelevance of an individual’s relationship to her own natural characteristics 
as some have suggested. Rawls’s words in context more often indicate that an individual’s 
place in the distribution of natural attributes within the population can be regarded as 
arbitrary. For example, he writes that “we do not deserve our place in the distribution of 
native endowments”, and he wishes to design a system in which “no one gains or loses 
from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets” (Rawls 1999, 87-89). By 
contrast, natural attributes themselves, as part and parcel of a person, can be considered 
no one else’s: “To be sure, the more advantaged have a right to their natural assets, as does 
everyone else; this right is covered [...] under the basic liberty protecting the integrity of 
3] See for example (Nozick 1974, 215-16).
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the person.” (Rawls 1999, 89). Rawls also writes, “The difference principle represents, 
in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a 
common asset and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the 
complementarities of this distribution.” (1999, 87).4
If this latter reading of Rawls is the correct one, then the purpose of the veil of 
ignorance is to eliminate the influence of an individual’s arbitrary place in the social 
distribution of natural attributes on the selection of principles of justice. Shielding an 
individual from knowledge of her own attributes (which Rawls agrees are determinate5) 
is simply his means of accomplishing this goal: if a person does not know what her 
natural attributes are, then she cannot know what place she occupies in the larger social 
distribution of those attributes.
But if this is Rawls’s goal, he makes a key mistake in his analysis of the choice faced 
in the original position, and this mistake gives the libertarian objection some purchase as 
a criticism of his results despite its inaccuracy as a criticism of his premises. When Rawls 
argues that a risk-averse person in the original position will choose principles of justice 
that maximize the wealth and income of the representative least-skilled worker in society, 
he inadvertently holds the social distribution of natural attributes constant and treats the 
individual chooser’s attributes as variable. The difference principle is the risk-averse choice 
if the total wealth in society (and therefore the distribution of attributes that generate this 
wealth) is fixed, but the individual selecting principles of justice does not know what her 
own attributes are. In this situation, it is risk-averse to maximize the smallest slice of the 
fixed pie in case one’s own attributes place one at the lowest “level of talent and ability” in 
this fixed distribution (Rawls 1999, 63). The possibility space presupposed by this analysis 
of the choice faced in the original position is inconsistent with Rawls’s stipulation that 
an individual is supposed to know that she has determinate natural attributes, even if she 
does not know what they are (1999, 127, 152).
An individual in the original position does not need to know what her attributes are, 
and she must not know where these attributes place her in the larger social distribution 
of such attributes, since this is the arbitrary relationship we wish to eliminate from 
consideration. However, she is supposed to know that she has determinate natural 
attributes. Other members of her society have determinate attributes as well, but she has 
no way of knowing whether the attributes of others will translate into higher or lower 
levels of talent and ability in society relative to her own. A person in the original position 
therefore ought to experience the social distribution of talent and ability around her as 
the variable feature in the analysis, which will, after she chooses principles of justice, 
be settled by a “natural lottery”. I will propose an “Unknown Society Model” that more 
accurately reflects the possibility space that remains after the original position eliminates 
4] Emphasis added.
5]  Rawls writes, “we must keep in mind that the parties in the original position are theoretically 
defined individuals.” (1999, 127)
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the arbitrary influence of an individual’s place in the social distribution of natural assets 
from consideration when principles of justice are chosen. 
Like Rawls, I assume that individuals in the original position are non-enviously 
seeking to maximize the value of an index of social primary goods including wealth, 
income, and positions of authority and responsibility that they can expect to receive, and 
that positions of authority and responsibility are sufficiently correlated with wealth and 
income that they need not be considered separately (Rawls 1999, 83). Also like Rawls, I 
assume that given the conditions of deep uncertainty and high stakes that prevail in the 
original position, individuals will appropriately have a “high level of risk aversion” when 
they choose principles of justice (Rawls 1999, 144), leading them to “adopt the alternative 
the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others” (Rawls 1999, 
133).
III. TH E U N K NOW N SOCI ET Y MODEL
The Unknown Society Model does not change the features of the original position 
itself. Rather, it is an alternative account of the possibility space created by the original 
position. It treats an individual’s natural endowments as an unknown constant rather than 
as a variable, reflecting the fact that individuals in the initial situation are “determinate 
persons” – they do not know what their specific attributes are, but they do know that they 
have specific attributes (Rawls 1999, 151-52). Second, the social distribution of “level[s] of 
talent and ability” (by which I understand Rawls to be referring to the market value of the 
constellation of natural traits that are useful for generating income) of members of society 
is treated as variable, since an individual in the original position has no idea what levels of 
talent and ability others in her society will have relative to herself (Rawls 1999, 63).
In the Unknown Society Model, a randomly selected individual – whom I will call 
Xenia from now on – must choose principles of justice knowing that her society might 
be comprised entirely of individuals with lower levels of talent and ability than hers, or 
higher. Alternatively, her level of talent and ability might fall somewhere in the middle 
of the distribution. Xenia also has no idea how large her society is, nor how wide the 
distribution of talent and ability might be. Her society might contain huge differences in 
levels of talent and ability, or everyone might be endowed with attributes that enable them 
to be roughly equally productive.6 Therefore, Xenia cannot choose principles of justice 
based on her arbitrary place in the social distribution of natural assets.
Xenia chooses principles of justice by considering the risks of the “natural lottery” that 
she faces: various places she might wind up occupying in the unknown social distribution 
of natural assets. To demonstrate the robust superiority of liberal equality to the difference 
principle in the face of this uncertainty, I will model Xenia’s relative expectations in terms 
6] Rawls envisioned a possible future society in which its members enjoy “the greatest equal talent”, 
although he does not suggest that this is very likely (1999, 93). 
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of wealth and income in three possible worlds in which she occupies three very different 
places in this social distribution:
Spartanville: In Spartanville, every other fully-participating member of society has 
a lower level of talent and ability than Xenia, who therefore finds herself at the very top of 
the social distribution of such attributes after she chooses principles of justice.
Equalitania: In Equalitania, all fully-participating members of society have equal 
“levels” of talent and ability (in the Rawlsian sense of market value), although those 
attributes may differ qualitatively.
Talentopia: In Talentopia, every other fully-participating member of society has a 
higher level of talent and ability than Xenia, who therefore finds herself at the very bottom 
of the social distribution of such attributes after she makes her decision.
Like Rawls, I assume that a system of social cooperation yields more wealth and 
income than the sum of what every participant might generate on her own (i.e. there are 
gains from trade within a society). I also adopt Rawls’s assumption that the system of 
liberal equality will generate shares of wealth and income that are roughly proportional 
to individuals’ relative levels of talent and ability in the social distribution thereof.7 
Additionally, I suppose along with Rawls that a redistributive policy “pushed beyond a 
certain point weakens incentives and thereby lowers production” although there is no 
need to decide where, empirically, that point might be (Rawls 1999, 142).
Finally, in accordance with Rawls’s stipulation that “there is no objection to resting 
the choice of first principles upon the general facts of economics and psychology”, I 
account for the possibility of what economists call “human capital externalities” (Rawls 
1999, 137). A human capital externality is the effect that a change in one person’s level of 
talent and ability has on the (inflation-adjusted) wealth and income of other members of 
her society.8 Economists attempting to measure human capital externalities have arrived 
at estimates that range from statistically insignificant to strongly positive.9 Xenia will deal 
with this uncertainty by considering her relative expectations in different possible states 
of the world under either assumption, and she will choose the principles of justice that 
maximize her expectations in terms of income and wealth in the worst possible state of 
the world.
In a system of liberal equality, Xenia will expect to have roughly equal amounts 
of wealth and income in Spartanville, Equalitania, and Talentopia if human capital 
externalities turn out to be insignificant. If they turn out to be significant, she will 
have more wealth and income in Equalitania than she will in Spartanville, and she will 
have more wealth and income in Talentopia than she will have anywhere else. If Xenia 
7]  That is, shares will be equal to those Rawls describes in a system of natural liberty except that 
they will no longer reflect inherited wealth and income due to the implementation of the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity (1999, 62-64). 
8] Daron Acemoglu explains, “Human capital externalities arise when the investment of an 
individual in his skills creates benefits for other agents in the economy.” (1996, 779).
9] See for example Lucas Jr (1988), Moretti (2004), and Thönnessen et al (2013).
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chooses a system of democratic equality instead of a system of liberal equality, the 
difference principle will increase what Xenia will expect to have in Talentopia (relative 
to her expectation under liberal equality), will decrease what Xenia will expect to have in 
Spartanville, and will leave her expectation in Equalitania unchanged. See Figure 1.
Figure 1: Xenia’s Expectations in Terms of Wealth and Income
Talentopia Equalitania Spartanville
Liberal Equality
(no human capital externalities) a a a
Liberal Equality
(positive human capital 
externalities)
a+b+c+d a+b+c a+b
Democratic Equality
(no human capital externalities) a+f a a-e
Democratic Equality (positive 
human capital externalities) a+b+c+d+h a+b+c a+b-g
Key to Figure 1 (all values are positive)
a Xenia’s expectation under liberal equality with no human capital externalities
b the value to Xenia of positive human capital externalities in Spartanville
c the additional value to Xenia of human capital externalities in Equalitania (compared to Spartanville)
d the additional value to Xenia of positive human capital externalities in Talentopia (compared to Equalitania)
e the value of the reduction in Xenia’s expectation in Spartanville with no human capital externalities under democratic equality (relative to liberal equality)
f the value of the increase in Xenia’s expectation in Talentopia with no human capital externalities under democratic equality (relative to liberal equality) 
g the value of the reduction in Xenia’s expectation in Spartanville with positive human capital externalities under democratic equality (relative to liberal equality)
h the value of the increase in Xenia’s expectation in Talentopia with no human capital externalities under democratic equality (relative to liberal equality)
For Xenia, the worst possible state of the world is Spartanville with no human capital 
externalities. To paraphrase Rawls, this is the world in which her enemy would place her 
(1999, 133). In this worst possible situation, Xenia will have more wealth and income if 
she has chosen to adopt the system of liberal equality (an expectation of a) than she will 
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in the system of democratic equality (an expectation of a-e). By contrast, Talentopia with 
human capital externalities is the best of all possible worlds for Xenia. In this system, she 
will fare even better under democratic equality (a+b+c+d+h) than she will under liberal 
equality (a+b+c+d). 
In other words, when Xenia regards her own attributes as constant, though 
unknown, and the distribution around her as variable, the difference principle is a risk-
loving principle – it further boosts Xenia’s already good expectations in Talentopia with 
human capital externalities, and it worsens her already poor expectations if she loses the 
“natural lottery” and is consigned to Spartanville without human capital externalities. 
Because Xenia is risk averse, she will choose to adopt the system of liberal equality and its 
principle of distribution according to market processes instead.10
I V. TH E SOCI A L BA SES OF SELF-R ESPECT
I have shown that when the possibility space created by the original position is 
properly defined, individuals in the original position will maximize the share of wealth 
and income they can expect to receive in the worst-case scenario by choosing the system 
of liberal equality. However, this outcome raises a possibility that Rawls did not have to 
address given that his own analysis yielded a system of democratic equality instead: the 
possibility that very high levels of income inequality might effectively deprive individuals 
near the bottom of the income distribution of the social bases of self-respect. While fair 
equality of opportunity would certainly limit the inequalities that arise in a system of 
liberal equality, it cannot entirely rule out the possibility of an extreme stratification of 
income and wealth among mature citizens that could potentially undermine the self-
respect of the relatively poor.
Rawls refers to self-respect as “perhaps the most important primary good” because 
“without it nothing may seem worth doing” (1999, 386). The social bases of self-respect 
include the resources necessary to carry out a rational plan of life in accordance with 
one’s conception of the good, and the ability to find a community inside the larger society 
“within which the activities that are rational for [the individual] are publicly affirmed 
by others” (Rawls 1999, 387). Rawls gestures at the lexical priority of self-respect over 
ordinary distributive concerns when he suggests that its importance “limits the forms 
of hierarchy and the degrees of inequality that justice permits” (1999, 92). I therefore 
believe that individuals in the original position would include a social safety net adequate 
10]  To be sure, different natural attributes will have different market values in different societies. 
For example, a person whose talents would make them a particularly good hair stylist, flower arranger, or 
cake decorator might find her skills relatively more valuable in a rich, post-industrial society, while a person 
whose talents lend themselves to physical combat and wilderness survival may find themselves more 
marketable, on average at least, in a poorer, pre-industrial society. But these uncertainties are bi-directional, 
exist at all points in the distribution of natural assets, and exist to an equal degree in Spartanville and 
Talentopia, so they cannot change the outcome of the analysis.
Marie E. Newhouse 106
to safeguard the social bases of self-respect among the basic equal liberties protected by 
Rawls’s first principle of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Rawls himself never evaluates liberal equality from the perspective of the original 
position, having considered and rejected this interpretation of his principles before 
undertaking his primary analysis. Given his understanding of the possibility space created 
by the features of the original position, he was right not to waste any time on the analysis: 
if the proper methodology is to compare the expectation in terms of wealth and income 
of the least skilled worker in a given society under liberal equality and under democratic 
equality, the difference principle yields an expectation equal to or better than market 
processes by definition, so democratic equality will be preferred.11
However, if I am correct in my account of the possibility space created by the original 
position, then Rawls rejected liberal equality prematurely. If the correct principles of 
justice are those that free and equal individuals would choose in a situation cleansed 
of the arbitrary influence of individuals’ relative positions in larger social distributions 
of income and wealth as well as natural assets, then liberal equality, cushioned by the 
inclusion of a social safety net among the basic equal liberties, appears to be the most just 
available system.
Of course, those currently committed to democratic equality are not rationally 
required to embrace my proposed version of liberal equality even if my analysis is 
correct. In the process of reflective equilibrium, there is no privileged starting place. A 
person confronted with a discrepancy between the widely shared and highly general 
principles incorporated into the initial situation and her considered convictions 
about the requirements of justice is free to revise either the general principles or the 
considered convictions (Rawls 1999, 17-19). Rawlsians convinced by my analysis but 
likewise convinced of the unacceptability of liberal equality might prefer to respond to 
my critique by revising the general principles that determine the features of the original 
position. For example, some might decide on reflection that a system of social cooperation 
should literally “draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it” rather 
than merely constructively doing so (Rawls 1999, 13). In that case, it might follow that a 
universal basic income should be adopted in preference to the more modest social safety 
net that I have suggested for inclusion among the basic equal liberties.
m.newhouse@surrey.ac.uk
11]  Even if it happens to be the case that market processes generate the best expectation possible for 
the least-skilled worker in a given society, then adopting the difference principle will result in a policy of 
distribution via market processes. The least-skilled worker in a given society therefore might do better, and 
can by definition do no worse, under democratic equality than she would under liberal equality.
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